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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over forty years ago, Lon Fuller cautioned against seeking to build “a 
utopia of legality in which all rules are perfectly clear, consistent with one 
another, known to every citizen, and never retroactive.”1  Such utopian 
visions presume “the rules remain constant through time, demand only what 
is possible, and are scrupulously observed by courts, police, and everyone 
else charged with their administration.”2  Because these desiderata are often 
either impractical or mutually contradictory, Fuller argued, such a utopia “is 
not actually a useful target for guiding the impulse toward legality.”3 
Nonetheless, in recent decades, scholars and practitioners wishing to 
promote economic development have attached high hopes to these same 
ambitions, now usually described as “the rule of law.”4  Backing these hopes 
is a familiar sequence of arguments.  A state constrained to obey the law is 
limited in its capacity to confiscate the property of private actors.5  Private 
actors, dealing with one another, also benefit from the rule of law, in the 
form of clear and effectively enforced rules specifying the rights of property 
owners and the duties of parties to contracts.6  Clarity in what the law 
prescribes and reliability in its implementation reduce the uncertainty 
economic actors face as they seek to calculate the costs and benefits of 
potential courses of action.7  Thus secured against the depredations of the 
state and the malfeasance of counterparties, commerce, production, and 
investment will flourish.   
The clear, consistent, generally known, and impartially administered law 
presumed in such arguments recapitulates the unrealistic image of the rule of 
law Fuller criticized.  These arguments are therefore a poor guide to practical 
action, as indeed a large critical literature on law and development has 
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id.   
 4 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 93–95 (2004), for a discussion of the 
relationship between Fuller’s ideas and contemporary notions of the rule of law.  On the hopes 
attached to the rule of law and economic development, see generally Okezie Chukwumerije, 
Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Link Between the Rule of Law and Economic Development, 23 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2009); John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 99 (2007); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM 
AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS (2008).  
 5 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution 
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 
803, 803–04 (1989).  
 6 Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 205, 207–09 (2008).  
 7 Max Weber, Prefatory Remarks to the Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion, in 
THE ESSENTIAL WEBER: A READER 101, 108 (Sam Whimster ed., 2004).  
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argued.8  The present Article concurs, but offers novel reasons for doing so.  
It argues that to understand the crucial theoretical issues and key practical 
challenges involved in promoting the rule of law as a route to development, 
one must investigate law’s allocation of authority.  Law allocates authority 
when it empowers someone to create legally relevant facts, that is, facts that 
help determine what specific acts the law will require, forbid, or allow.  For 
instance, actors may be authorized to sign a contract that creates a legally 
enforceable obligation.  Frustrated creditors, under specified circumstances, 
may be authorized to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against their debtors, 
which limit debtors’ ability to control their property.  More generally, the 
ordinary, decentralized to-and-fro of a market economy—buying and selling 
and lending and borrowing, in all their many forms—leaves eddies of legal 
consequences, changing the facts to which rules established by statute must 
be applied. 
A focus on law’s allocation of authority departs from the perspective on 
law implicit in most discussions of the rule of law.  This implicit perspective 
assumes that law’s influence results from the behaviors it either prohibits or 
mandates.  Thus, income must not be hidden from the tax authorities.  Debts 
to suppliers must be paid.  Sanitation inspectors must not base their 
conclusions on the sufficiency vel non of bribes.  For policy, focusing on 
law’s prohibitions and mandates leads to a concomitant focus on law 
enforcement (i.e., the agencies that detect and repair or punish violations of 
law’s positive and negative injunctions).  Such agencies might include 
courts, bailiffs, procuracies or prosecutors, and the police, among others.  A 
prohibitions-and-mandates view of law also directs attention to the education 
and organization of the legal profession, which staffs some of these agencies 
and assists citizens in interactions with them.   
The prohibitions-and-mandates perspective on law, and the concomitant 
focus on law enforcement, obscure a crucial point highlighted by the 
authorizations perspective: what actors do with their lawful discretion has an 
enormous impact on the practicality of the aims specified under any 
definition of the rule of law.  This is so because calculable interpretation and 
reliable implementation of law, which lie at the core of the aspiration to build 
a rule of law, are not solely a function of legislative precision and 
bureaucratic rectitude.  The feasibility of attaining predictable interpretation 
                                                                                                                                                       
 8 Recent overviews of this literature may be found in Ohnesorge, supra note 4; 
Chukwumerije, supra note 4.  See also THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-
Kessaris eds., 2003); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 30, 2002), available at http://www.carnegieen 
dowment.org/files/wp30.pdf.  
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and implementation of legal rules depends directly on the facts to which 
rules are applied, and many of the relevant facts will be the result of lawfully 
authorized discretion.  Accordingly, the thesis of this Article is that a 
workable, sustainable rule of law can only exist where law does not grant 
authority to some actors that allow them to affect the legal rights of other 
actors in unpredictable ways through the creation of legal facts.   
Put differently, this Article argues that the practicality of the rule of law 
depends on the “calibration” of authorizations, i.e., precise adjustment for a 
particular purpose.9  To take an example discussed more extensively below, 
to protect creditors’ rights, creditors may be authorized to perform certain 
acts in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.  Narrow authorizations would 
not permit creditors to recover funds from debtors intent on avoiding 
repayment.  On the other hand, sweeping authorizations can tempt creditors 
to connive at launching bankruptcy claims merely to exploit these 
authorizations, and this conniving will necessarily foster the spread of 
uncertainty.  The term calibration captures the intricacy of adjusting 
authorizations such that they achieve legislators’ purposes without enabling 
actors to undermine predictability in the interpretation and implementation of 
law. 
The Part II of this Article briefly relates these claims about law’s 
authorizations to existing literature, and explains in a more detailed way the 
radical implications of this view for understanding the challenges in building 
the rule of law.  As an illustration of these implications, Part III then turns to 
the case of post-socialist Russia.  The recent and sudden character of 
Russia’s effort to move to a law-governed capitalist economy offers multiple 
examples of the direct relationship between poorly calibrated authorizations 
and the reliable operation of the rule of law.  Dealing with legal provisions 
that bear on the security of property rights, the Article will demonstrate the 
ways in which poorly calibrated authorizations can undermine the 
predictability of the legal system and the practicality of its effective control 
over behavior, and the kinds of legal changes needed to redress these 
problems.  Finally, Part IV will discuss broader implications regarding the 
character of the rule of law and the project of harnessing it to development.   
II.  LAW’S ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY AND RULE OF LAW IDEALS 
To propose that law allocates authority is hardly novel; legal scholars are 
well aware of the point.10  Wesley Hohfeld, for instance, used law’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
 9 Paraphrased from one sense of “to calibrate.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/calibrate (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
 10 See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 1, at 93 (“A familiar distinction between rules of law is that 
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allocation of authority as part of his demonstration of the correlative 
character of legal rights: permitting acts to one person requires enjoining 
others from interfering with those acts.11  John R. Commons and Robert Hale 
stressed that the bargaining power available to negotiating parties depends on 
what the law authorizes them to do if an agreement is not reached.12  By 
demonstrating the omnipresence of law in shaping the basic transactions of 
capitalism, the insights of these and other scholars in the related schools of 
“old” institutional economics and legal realism added up to a powerful 
argument against the very coherence of advocating state non-interference in 
markets.13  More recently, the Critical Legal Studies movement has drawn on 
this intellectual legacy to challenge the political neutrality and syllogistic 
heft of “efficiency” as a standard for crafting the legal institutions 
underpinning markets.14 
What scholars do not seem to have done, though, is relate the actual use 
of legal authorizations to the prospects for building the rule of law.  Yet, on 
reflection, the relevance is manifest.  Consider “thin” definitions of the rule 
of law, which try to avoid tackling difficult normative questions about the 
ultimate purposes of law.15  (Insofar as normatively richer “thick” definitions 
of the rule of law supplement thin definitions with additional substantive 
requirements, the argument advanced here applies to them a fortiori.)  Thin 
definitions ordinarily require, in part, that the laws be clear, consistent, 
relatively stable, and publicly promulgated.16  Jointly, these requirements 
should provide a basis for relatively reliable expectations about laws’ 
implementation.  As F.A. Hayek famously put it, the rule of law exists when 
“government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced before-
hand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan 
                                                                                                                                                       
which distinguishes rules imposing duties from rules conferring legal capacities.”).  
 11 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 44 (1913).  
 12 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. 
SCI. Q. 470, 474 (1923); JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 54–56 
(1924).  
 13 BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE 
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT passim (1998).  
 14 Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 711 passim (1980); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC: ESSAYS ON THE POWER 
AND POLITICS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 83–125 (1993).  
 15 For discussions and examples of “thin” and “thick” definitions of the rule of law, see 
Nicholas Fegen, Thick or Thin? Defining Rule of Law: Why the “Arab Spring” Calls for a 
Thin Rule of Law Theory, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1187, 1197–98 (2012).  
 16 Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional 
Conclusion, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); 
TAMANAHA, supra note 4.  
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one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”17  At first glance, 
this would appear to be a set of standards relatively easy to attain, as long as 
legislators have the will to do so, since careful drafting of statutes, reluctance 
to modify them, and reliable publicity should be well within the powers of 
most legislatures.  The practical relevance of this legislative stance may be 
undermined by spotty or corrupt implementation, but nonetheless it appears 
that some core aspects of the rule of law require only political will.  
The impression that inspection of statutes would be sufficient to assess 
these aspects of the rule of law is dispelled once the importance of legally 
authorized discretion is recognized.  There are two reasons for this.  First, 
when it is in their interests to do so, actors can and do use their lawful 
discretion to orchestrate sets of legal facts that pose “hard cases” where law 
is revealed to be unclear or inconsistent.18  Inconsistency or opacity in 
statutes is only latent until someone tries to make use of them in actual 
practice as permitted by legal authorizations.  By the same token, laws that 
appear consistent and pellucid when drafted may prove to be far less so in 
application.  Second, even when laws are consistent, unambiguously 
applicable to cases, and publicly available, which laws are relevant to a 
particular set of circumstances may be unknown to some actors.19  Insofar as 
the set of pertinent legal facts arises from the decisions of the multitudinous 
actors authorized to create these legal facts, divining the applicable rules in a 
particular instance may be extremely difficult.  The stability required under a 
thin definition of the rule of law, therefore, is not solely a function of how 
frequently the laws on the books change.  The uses made of unchanging rules 
can change radically with legal innovation.  Lawful discretion allows pre-
announced rules to be manipulated or applied in unanticipated ways.  “Fair 
certainty,” therefore, is not solely a function of the laws on the books, but 
also of whether use of these laws follows predictable channels.   
Thin definitions of the rule of law generally include not only the above-
mentioned preconditions for predictability, but also the notion that statutes 
should be more than wordy irrelevancies to practical life.  As Peerenboom 
puts it, “[l]aws must be enforced—the gap between the law on books and law 
                                                                                                                                                       
 17 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: WITH THE INTELLECTUALS AND 
SOCIALISM 72 (1944).  
 18 Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 
1405, 1454–55 (2000).  
 19 In discussing public promulgation as an aspect of the “inner morality of law,” a notion 
closely related to the “thin” definition of the rule of law under discussion here, Fuller cautions 
against imagining that it is possible for everyone to be fully acquainted with the laws that 
apply to them.  FULLER, supra note 1, at 49.  In his sole mention of legal authorizations (“rules 
conferring legal capacities”), Fuller notes that the limits of knowledge will be particularly 
acute in the case of such rules, since they do not readily correspond to ordinary rules of 
morality.  Id. at 93. 
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in practice should be relatively narrow—and fairly applied.”20  Since “as a 
practical matter, relying on compulsory enforcement for every law or most 
laws is costly and impractical,” a thin rule of law can only exist, Peerenboom 
suggests, if the laws are broadly acceptable to citizens.21  Note that 
Peerenboom’s discussion here implicitly relies on an image of law as 
composed not of allocations of authority, but of mandates and prohibitions.  
This implies a concomitant focus on “legality providers”—law enforcement 
agencies and courts charged with compelling observance of mandates and 
prohibitions.  There is general acceptance of the point that the capacity of 
legality providers will be degraded if laws are unacceptable, e.g., prohibition 
of alcohol in most countries is likely to prompt not just widespread violation, 
but also ineffectiveness and corruption in the law enforcement agencies 
tasked with carrying it out.22  A law mandating extremely high levels of tax 
payments is likely to have the same effect.   
Extending the above analysis to encompass law’s allocation of authority, 
which shifts the emphasis from law enforcement to law use, reveals that the 
same point applies when what is at issue is not the violation of law, but the 
manipulation of it by those to whom the law allocates authority.  Insofar as 
actors scour law for potential contradictions and loopholes that allow them to 
use their authorizations to their maximum advantage, authorizations poorly 
calibrated to circumstances can have the same debilitating effects on law 
providers as widely despised legal prohibitions or mandates have.  The 
practicality of the rule of law depends not only on what law requires and 
forbids, but also the authorizations the law grants.  As demonstrated below, 
laws can, and sometimes do, allocate authority in ways that undermine 
aspirations of the rule of law.   
A further implication of emphasizing law’s allocation of authority is that 
unchanging rules—as required in Hayek’s definition of the rule of law,23 and 
as endorsed by those who see constitutional constraints as the key bulwark of 
property—may in practice undermine, and not sustain, the predictable 
exercise of law.  When legal innovation gives existing rules new purposes 
and destabilizes established patterns of interactions, the result is a disruption 
of predictability.24  Therefore, the practicability of the rule of law ideal of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 20 Peerenboom, supra note 16, at 2.  
 21 Id. at 48 n.3; cf. FULLER, supra note 1, at 153.  
 22 See, e.g., John T. Schuler & Arthur McBride, Notes from the Front: A Dissident Law-
Enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893 (1989).  
 23 VON HAYEK, supra note 17, at 72. 
 24 For example, consider Llewellyn’s discussion of the tactical use of tender rules as a 
pretense to refuse acceptance of a shipment contracted at a price subsequently regarded by the 
purchaser as unfavorable.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 122–23 (1960).  Even if such rules were in force and well known before a contract 
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“fair certainty” depends on mechanisms facilitating change in laws (or their 
authoritative interpretation) in order to create stable expectations.25  When 
confronted with legal rules turned to unexpected and troubling uses, people 
often describe the rules in question as “loopholes.”  In these terms, one may 
say fair certainty of law depends on loophole closing mechanisms. 
A final, broadly accepted attribute of the rule of law is “meaningful 
restraints on the state.”26  An authorizations view of law sheds new light on 
this issue as well.  The problem of calibrating authorizations applies not only 
to economic actors, but also to those directly employed by the state: judges, 
prosecutors, police officers, bailiffs, sanitation inspectors, tax collectors, etc.  
These individuals too are authorized under law to create new legal facts with 
a degree of discretion, via a court decision, an investigation, an arrest, a 
confiscation, an inspection, etc.  And they may use these authorizations in 
unanticipated ways that undermine the stability of expectations.  In practice, 
meaningful restraints depend not just on what the state is forbidden from 
doing, but even more directly on what the state’s agents are authorized to do.   
The arguments in this section concerned the implications for the rule of 
law that derive from how law authorizes agents to create legally significant 
facts.  Common aspects of the definition of the rule of law, designed to 
ensure that law’s application will be predictable for those subject to it and 
practical for the institutions charged with carrying it out, appear in a different 
light when the discussion of authorizations is incorporated.  What actors do 
with their authorizations affects the capacity of both statutes and institutions 
to secure the aims of the rule of law.  In particular, reliable predictions of the 
effect of law may be possible only if laws are changed.  Practical challenges 
for the rule of law arise not only from the need to enforce law’s mandates 
and prohibitions, but also from the need to react to a multitude of pertinent 
facts lawfully established by those authorized to do so.  TABLE 1 summarizes 
these points. 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
was concluded, prior practice would not necessarily have led sellers to expect those rules to be 
exploited to take advantage of changing market conditions.   
 25 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Certainty of the Law: Reasons, Situation-Types, Analogy, and 
Equilibrium, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 209, 224 (1999); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW 
AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 219–24 (2008).  
 26 Peerenboom, supra note 16, at 2.  
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TABLE 1: PREREQUISITES OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 PREREQUISITES WHERE LAW SPECIFIES: 
FEATURE OF RULE OF 
LAW: 
MANDATES AND  
PROHIBITIONS AUTHORIZATIONS 
   
PREDICTABILITY ●  Clarity, consistency, and 
publicity of statutes 
●  Clarity, consistency, and publicity 
of legally relevant circumstances 
 ●  Legal stasis ●  Adaptive legal change 
   
PRACTICABILITY ●  Broad acceptance ●  Absence of contextually corrosive 
authorized discretion 
 ●  Adequately staffed, funded, or trained organizations  
III.  EVOLUTION OF AUTHORIZATIONS IN RUSSIA 
The foregoing arguments offer a new perspective on how to understand 
the process of establishing the rule of law in countries seeking to 
development on that basis.  As discussed more extensively in the conclusion, 
the law-and-development movement has focused its attention on the left-
hand column of Table 1, pushing for the adoption of “best practice” 
legislation that will not require further change, and funding the organizations 
intended to enforce law’s mandates and prohibitions.27  Yet for rule-of-law 
ends to be attained, attention to the right-hand column is also required.   
This Part of the Article examines the plausibility of this claim.  In 
ordinary assessments of the rule of law, snapshots of the legal system at a 
moment in time tend to be the proper form of methodology.  Progress or 
regress over time is measured as the difference between one snapshot and the 
next.  However, the pathways towards achievement of rule-of-law ends 
associated with the authorizing vision of law imply a different methodology.  
This methodology involves describing emergent patterns in the use of 
authorizations, narrating processes of successful or forestalled legal 
evolution over time, and seeking causal mechanisms that play a repetitive 
role. 
Such a methodology will now be applied to some legal developments in 
post-Soviet Russia.  It bears emphasis that what follows does not pretend to 
the status of a full-fledged, up-to-the-minute survey of Russian legality: 
examples from Russia’s post-Soviet history were chosen to demonstrate the 
practical significance of allocations of authority for efforts to establish the 
rule of law.  Russia is a useful case for such an illustrative purpose; for 
                                                                                                                                                       
 27 Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 98 (2002); Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of 
Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31, 61–65 
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).  
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although the problem of calibrating authorizations is entirely generic to legal 
systems, Russia’s particular circumstances have rendered this problem 
especially vivid.  Like other post-socialist states, Russia faced the task of 
drafting key market-enabling legislation when markets were at best nascent, 
if not embryonic.  As a result, even with the best intentions in the world, 
legislators faced great difficulties in predicting what sort of legal collisions 
might arise.  Foreign models, whether sought out by domestic actors or 
encouraged by the international community, served to bridge the gap 
between the murky post-communist present and the capitalist future, but 
these unsurprisingly often proved inappropriate for local circumstances.28  
Also, as a commodity-exporting state, Russia has been subject to 
staggeringly large swings in relative prices as the value of hydrocarbons and 
metals have changed in the world market.29  Radical price shifts change the 
incentives that actors bring to their dealings with the legal system, potentially 
creating new challenges to the predictability and practicability of the rule of 
law.   
Two examples of poorly calibrated authorizations that undermine the rule 
of law will be discussed here.  The first is the evolution of struggles over 
corporate property from the beginning of Russian privatization until the 
2000s.  The form of privatization, as discussed below, touched off long-
running battles over ownership of the industrial assets created in the Soviet 
era.  Contenders in these battles used both mundane authorizations, such as 
the right to buy and sell shares, and more recondite ones in an effort to create 
a pattern of stock ownership that would allow for stable governance of the 
corporations descended from socialist enterprises.  Efforts to close the 
loopholes uncovered in this process—in other words, to recalibrate 
authorizations—are also described in this Part. 
Because the authorizations approach recognizes that private property and 
contract in effect deputize non-state actors to carry out legally significant 
actions, and that such deputations can have a potentially disruptive effect on 
legal certainty, it does not make a sharp distinction between the problem of 
‘binding the state’ and ‘binding private actors.’  Both must be constrained to 
act within limits that are consistent with predictability.  The second portion 
of this Part illustrates this point by charting areas where an excess of 
discretion by state agents proved disruptive to predictability, demonstrating 
                                                                                                                                                       
 28 Kathryn Hendley, Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia, 13 POST-SOVIET AFF. 228, 
229–30 (1997).  
 29 Nikola Spatafora & Irina Tytell, Commodity Terms of Trade: The History of Boom and 
Busts 3–7, 31 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/205, 2009), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1486523.  
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how political contention over how to restore certainty revolved around issues 
clearly recognizable as calibration of authorizations. 
A.  Battles over Corporate Ownership 
Russian privatization involved wholesale creation of new legal facts.  
What had been socialist ‘enterprises’ under unitary state ownership became 
corporations and issued shares of stock.30  These shares of stock then passed 
to the public via a variety of mechanisms.31  While the details need not be 
examined, what these mechanisms had in common was their tendency to 
create distributions of corporate shareholding that practically guaranteed 
conflict.32  In the standard post-privatization situation, with some 
overgeneralization, enterprise “insiders” in management accumulated 
majority shareholdings, joining de jure to de facto control, while outsiders 
held a minority stake.33  Laws and presidential orders required that minority 
shareholders be given a reasonable opportunity to participate in corporate 
governance, but these rules were quite universally ignored in practice: 
insiders ran firms in their own interests and ignored outsiders.34  While both 
statutory and organizational resources for securing minority shareholder 
rights were weak,35 neither of these circumstances explains why flouting of 
the rules was so widespread.  Simply put, majority insider owners had no 
incentives to share profit and governance with minority shareholders.  
Minority shareholders had not contributed to the firm’s capital; most often 
they acquired shares at “voucher auctions” where the currency of purchase 
was privatization certificates that had been freely distributed to the public.36  
Moreover, the new shareholders generally had no business relations with the 
corporation in question other than that of ownership.37  In short, nothing 
other than the legal requirements—neither capital needs nor business ties—
                                                                                                                                                       
 30 See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What 
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1739–42 (2000); ANDREW BARNES, OWNING RUSSIA 75 
(2006); JOSEPH R. BLASI ET AL., KREMLIN CAPITALISM: THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMY (1997).  
 31 Black et al., supra note 30, at 1741; BARNES, supra note 30, at 75.  
 32 See generally David M. Woodruff, Property Rights in Context: Privatization’s Legacy 
for Corporate Legality in Poland and Russia, 38 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 82 (2004) 
(discussing the relationship between Russian privatization and conflicts around corporate 
property).  
 33 Id. at 96. 
 34 Black et al., supra note 30, at 1941; Katharina Pistor, Company Law and Corporate 
Governance in Russia, in THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 165, 170–75 
(Jeffrey D. Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., 1997).  
 35 Pistor, supra note 34, at 170–75.  
 36 MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRIVATIZING RUSSIA 81–85 (1995).  
 37 Woodruff, supra note 32, at 95.  
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encouraged majority shareholders to accept the rights of minority 
shareholders, and they did not.38  With share ownership of so little practical 
worth without de facto control, market stock valuations remained 
exceedingly low, in turn made selling an unattractive option.39  If outsider 
shareholders wanted to make something of their nominal ownership rights, 
they would have to fight for them.  The same was true even in the relatively 
small number of cases when money was paid for shares in privatization, as in 
the notorious loans-for-shares deals of the mid-1990s that gave outsiders 
controlling stakes in some of the country’s most attractive raw materials 
enterprises for very small payments.  The funds involved went to 
government.  The share purchasers were generally not partners of insider 
management and turning formal ownership into de facto control required 
ferocious legal battles.40 
In these battles, the opportunities offered by the various authorizations 
incident on share ownership and other legally formulated relationships were 
absolutely crucial.  Both insiders and outsiders struggled to use their own 
authorizations to render those of their opponents useless.  The high stakes 
involved meant large resources were devoted to legal inventiveness, and 
many facially reasonable statutes were found to create mechanisms for the 
forced transfer of shares.  Two examples now follow. 
1.  Share Consolidations 
In December of 1995, Russia passed a law on corporations.41 The 
carefully drafted legislation was intended to redress common grievances by 
strengthening the ability of minority shareholders to constrain company 
management, in particular by granting them voice in or vetoes over decisions 
that might harm minority shareholder interests.42  These procedural 
safeguards were designed to be “self-enforcing,” in the sense that minority 
shareholders would be given the opportunity to defend their own rights, 
rather than relying primarily on an outside agency.43  The rights granted to 
minority shareholders were sufficiently strong that some would later decry 
                                                                                                                                                       
 38 Id.; Black et al., supra note 30, at 1771–72. 
 39 Woodruff, supra note 32, at 95.  
 40 BARNES, supra note 30, at 82.  
 41 Federal’nyi zakon ot 26 dekabria 1995 g. ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh [Federal Law 
of 26 December 1995 # 208-FZ on Stock Companies], ROS. GAZ., Dec. 29, 1995, available at 
http://www.rg.ru/1995/12/29/ao-dok.html.  
 42 Bernard Black & Reiner Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1932–33 (1992).  
 43 Id.  
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them as enabling greenmail and corporate raiding by holders of small blocks 
of shares that had made little investment in a company.44 
Nevertheless, in at least one respect, the law created a new vulnerability 
for minority shareholders.  Among its provisions was one authorizing 
shareholders’ meetings to initiate share consolidations, also known as 
“reverse stock splits,” in which outstanding shares would be consolidated 
into a smaller number and distributed proportionally to existing holdings.45  
For example, a consolidation might reduce the number of shares from 
100,000 to 10,000, with shareholders receiving ten new shares for each old 
share.  Some shareholders, of course, could be left with fractional shares.  
Under the law, such shareholders would be compensated for their fractional 
shares at “market value” determined by the corporation’s board of directors 
in light of some general guidelines.46 
Shareholders locked in sharp contention over corporate control soon 
discovered that the law’s authorization of share consolidation could be a 
powerful weapon.  With a sufficiently large reduction in the number of 
outstanding shares in a corporation, majority shareholders could convert 
minority shareholders’ stakes to fractional shares, subject to mandatory sale 
back to the corporation at a price fixed by the corporate board of directors.  
In a widely publicized conflict in 2001, for example, the Volgogradskii 
Zavod Burovoi Tekhniki (the Volgograd Drilling Equipment Factory, 
VZBT) converted its 178,635 shares into four shares, forcing minority 
shareholders to sell their stakes at a board-determined “market price.”47  In 
the absence of public trading of the shares, the law left the board wide 
discretion.48  The price they chose was not an attractive one, valuing the 
company at only $2.2 million.49  In January, minority shareholders had 
publicly said they were ready to pay seven million dollars for just a quarter 
of the shares.50 
                                                                                                                                                       
 44 A. Glushetskii, Kto zashchitit ot minoritariia, ili bogatye tozhe plachut [Who Will 
Protect Us from the Minority Shareholders, or the Rich Also Weep], EKON. I ZH. Mar. 20, 
2004, available at http://ebiblioteka.ru/sources/article.jsp?id=6138726.  
 45 Federal’nyi zakon ot 26 dekabria 1995 goda # 208-FZ ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh, 
supra note 41. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Aleksandr Privalov, Konsultant uzhe v gorode [The Consultant is Already in Town], 
EKSPERT, Apr. 9, 2001, available at http://ebiblioteka.ru/searchresults/article.jsp?art=15&id=27 
95671.  
 48 Federal’nyi zakon ot 26 dekabria 1995 goda # 208-FZ ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh, 
supra note 41.  
 49 Calculated from figures given in Svetlana Novolodskaia, Konsolidatsiia burovoi tekhniki 
[The Consolidation of Drilling Equipment], VEDOMOSTI, Apr. 4, 2001, available at http://www. 
ebiblioteka.ru/sources/article.jsp?id=8930483.  
 50 Na zavode burovoi tekhniki smenilas’ vlast’ [The Regime at the Drilling Equipment 
Factory has Changed], DELOVOE POVOLZH’E, Jan. 24, 2001, available at http://www.ebibliot 
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While perhaps the loudest such conflict over share consolidation the 
VZBT consolidation was far from an anomaly.  The first detectable use of 
the corporate law in this way occurred in late 1996, when the Akron 
Corporation, a fertilizer manufacturer based in Novgorod, consolidated 
29,000 outstanding shares into a single share.51  This meant all shareholders 
had to accept compensation and put control of the corporation into the hands 
of existing management, which later issued new shares.  Widespread efforts 
to exploit the loophole seem to have begun late in 2000.  A representative of 
the Federal Securities Commission (FSC) reported in November that it was 
rejecting many applications for share consolidations that would hurt minority 
shareholders.52  However, because consolidation was provided for under the 
law, the FSC could itself only seek technical grounds for rejecting 
applications.53  In February 2001, the FSC approved an application by the 
Sibneft oil firm, which wanted to carry out share consolidations at several 
partially owned subsidiaries.54  An FSC deputy chair claimed to have used 
every technical possibility to delay approval of the transaction, complained 
that legislation had forced the commission’s hand, and noted the FSC was 
calling for legislative changes to ban the practice.  
In sum, Russian corporate law’s authorization of share consolidations 
created circumstances that undermined both the predictability of shareholder 
rights and the practicality of reliable implementation.  Indeed, the FSC found 
itself trading these two desiderata of the rule of law against one another: they 
                                                                                                                                                       
eka.ru/sources/printarticle.jsp?id=2719130.  
 51 Region, OKTIABRSKAIA MAGISTRAL’ (SAINT PETERSBURG) (Dec. 17, 1996), available at 
http://www.integrumworld.com; Anatolii Teider, Konsolidiruites’ otsiudova!, EKSPERT, May 19, 
1997, available at http://aafnet.integrum.ru/artefact3/ia/ia5.aspx?lv=8&si=QJDXxY2R&qu=22 
1&bi=565&nd=2&srt=0&tnd=0&f=0&st=0.  
 52 Ivan Kozlov, FKTsB protiv konsolidatsii aktsii [The FSC Opposes Share Consolidation], 
VEDOMOSTI, Nov. 30, 2000, available at http://ebiblioteka.ru/sources/article.jsp?id=3710966.  
 53 Cf. id. (noting that lack of normative limits on the share conversion coefficient). 
 54 Petr Rushailo & Petr Sapozhnikov, Sibneft’ prosochilas’ skvoz’ FKTsB [Sibneft’ has 
Seeped Through the FSC], KOMMERS., Mar. 13, 2001, available at http://ebiblioteka.ru/source 
s/article.jsp?id=3717601.  Legal challenges to consolidation transactions after the fact were 
generally no more successful.  While lower court judges sometimes ruled in favor of minority 
shareholders, arguing that the “repurchase” mandated under the law should be considered a 
voluntary transaction to which the minority shareholders would agree, higher courts 
concluded that payment and acceptance of compensation at market value for fractional shares 
was in fact mandatory for both parties.  Dmitrii Butrin & Irina Mokrousova, Pravoprimenenie. 
Drobnye aktsii ne priznali imushchestvom [Jurisprudence.  Fractional Shares Not Recognized 
as Property], KOMMERS., Feb. 25, 2004, available at http://ebiblioteka.ru/searchresults/article.j 
sp?art=17&id=5937472 (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); Postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda RF 
ot 24 fevralia 2004 g. abz. 4 p. 5.1 [paragraph 4 section 5.1 of the Ruling of the Russian 
Federation Constitutional Court of Feb. 24, 2004], ROS. GAZ., Mar. 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/03/02/ks-dok.html.  This was probably the interpretation that would 
have been embraced by the law’s authors.  Black & Kraakman, supra note 42, at 1967 n.120.  
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could protect minority shareholder’s expectations only by themselves 
looking for adventitious, unrelated reasons for rejecting consolidation 
petitions.55  Where traditional views of the rule of law emphasize the 
importance of keeping laws stable, it was only an adaptive legal change that 
eventually eliminated the use of share consolidations as a tool to dispossess 
minority shareholders.  The relevant provisions—which authorized 
shareholders to retain and vote fractional shares if they wished to—were 
adopted by the Russian parliament in the summer of 2001, and came into 
force in the beginning of 2002.56  
2.  Corporate Bankruptcy 
Another example of the way law-granted authorizations became 
entangled in conflicts over corporate control concerns debt enforcement.  
The authority to invoke state aid in enforcing debts is the authority to take 
debtors’ property against their will.57  If debt enforcement is to create 
predictability and security of property rights, the conditions under which this 
authority is invoked must be clear.  However, to the extent that creditors 
actively seek to gain the most from the authority the law grants to them, debt 
enforcement rules may well come to undermine debtors’ expectations about 
property rights.  In 1998, Russia passed a law on bankruptcy designed to 
improve creditors’ rights.58  The law set a relatively low threshold for the 
amount of unpaid debt a creditor needed to initiate bankruptcy proceedings, 
and for the amount of time it needed to be outstanding.  Russia’s Arbitrazh or 
commercial courts had jurisdiction over the proceedings.59  They were 
charged to apply a standard of a failure to pay obligations, rather than an 
assessment of general solvency, as the criterion of whether bankruptcy 
should be initiated.60  Once bankruptcy was initiated, shareholders 
                                                                                                                                                       
 55 Rushailo & Sapozhinikov, supra note 54.  
 56 Ekaterina Kats, Dolgii put’ k poriadku [The Long Road to Order], VREMIA NOVOSTEI, 
June 29, 2001, available at http://ebiblioteka.ru/sources/article.jsp?id=2457240. 
 57 Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 14, at 741.  
 58 Description of the law in the rest of the paragraph follows William P. Kratzke, Russia’s 
Intractable Economic Problems and the Next Steps in Legal Reform: Bankruptcy and the 
Depoliticization of Business, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (2000).  
 59 These are sometimes referred to as the “arbitration courts” in English translations, but, as 
Katherine Hendley points out, this is confusing because “arbitration” is not their function. 
Kathryn Hendley, Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 
365 (2006).  Since some civil matters are also heard in the separate “courts of general 
jurisdiction,” referred to in the text as the general court system, conflicts around jurisdiction 
have been frequent.  See Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia, 42 INT’L 
LAW. 1207, 1219 (2008).  
 60 Kratzke, supra note 58, at 34.  
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immediately lost all control over the corporation’s assets and transactions.61  
Control passed first to an interim manager, and then quickly to a creditors’ 
meeting, in which creditors held voting rights (on most questions) that were 
proportional to the value of the debt owed to them.62   
It soon developed that these sweeping authorizations granted to creditors 
meant that bankruptcy law could be turned to purposes other than recovery 
of unpaid loans.63  Often creditors would try to avoid accepting repayment of 
debts, preferring the opportunities participation in the creditors’ council 
offered.64  Creditors’ councils were sometimes able to confiscate firm stock 
against their debts, or to arrange auctions of corporate shares in ways that 
ensured favored purchasers received an inside track.65  What were in effect 
hostile takeovers via bankruptcy, with expropriation of equity owners, went 
forward on a massive scale.66 
As in the case of share consolidations, this miscalibration of 
authorizations had the effect of undermining the rule of law.  Reliable 
implementation was threatened as procedural decisions in bankruptcy cases 
                                                                                                                                                       
 61 This is quite different from the U.S. debtor-in-control system, and more like the German 
pro-creditor policy.  For comparative bankruptcy law see Iraj Hoshi, Bankruptcy, 
Reorganization, and Liquidation in Mature Market Economies: Lessons for Economies in 
Transition, in ENTERPRISE EXIT PROCESSES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: DOWNSIZING, 
WORKOUTS, AND LIQUIDATION 19 (Leszek Balcerowicz et al. eds. 1998); David A. Skeel, An 
Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325 
(1998).  
 62 Kratzke, supra note 58, at 39–40.  
 63 Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence 6 
(Ctr. Econ. & Fin. Res., Working Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=253334; Aleksandr Volkov & Aleksandr Privalov, Khudshii zakon Rossii 
[The Worst Law in Russia], EKSPERT, Oct. 22, 2001; Vadim Volkov, The Selective Use of State 
Capacity in Russia’s Economy: Property Disputes and Enterprise Takeovers, 1998–2002, in 
CREATING SOCIAL TRUST IN POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION (János Kornai et al. eds., 2004); 
Woodruff, supra note 32, at 98; Firestone, supra note 59, at 1210–11.  
 64 For instance, in the prominent struggle over the Siberian oil firm Chernogorneft’, its 
parent company, Sidanco, repeatedly offered to repay all of Chernogorneft’s outstanding debts 
to extricate the firm from bankruptcy proceedings, but was unable to force creditors to accept 
payment.  MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, THE PIRATIZATION OF RUSSIA: RUSSIAN REFORM GOES 
AWRY 144–46 (2003).  
 65 Kriminal’nye bankrotstva rushat ekonomiku.  V Rossii aktivno razvivaetsia praktika 
zakhvata krupnykh prepriiatii za schet fiktivnykh bankrotstv [Criminal Bankruptcies are 
Ruining the Economy.  The Practice of Corporate Takeovers Using Fictional Bankruptcies is 
Rapidly Expanding in Russia], NEZAVISIMAIA GAZ., Apr. 26, 2002, available at http://dlib.eas 
tview.com/browse/doc/3802121.  
 66 Peredel v zakone [Redivision via Law], NEZAVISIMAIA GAZ., Sept. 28, 2001, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/284772.  In this interview, Tatiana Trefilova, director of 
the Federal Service for Finanical Restoration, said that around 12,000 bankruptcy cases had 
been initiated that year, with nearly 30,000 active overall, and stated that “approximately a 
third of creditors [who initiated bankruptcy] were interested not in receiving money, but in 
changing the owners.”  Id.  
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came to have significance in the hundreds of millions of dollars, rendering 
widespread suspicion of the suborning or illegitimate partiality of judges 
quite plausible.67  Knowledge of legally relevant facts became elusive as 
entrepreneurial lawyers, responding to similar incentives, sought far and 
wide for legal circumstances that might enable them to block or facilitate 
bankruptcy procedures, for instance via judges’ injunctions as discussed 
below.  In one major bankruptcy conflict it was reported that there were 
efforts to serve as many ten injunctions from different jurisdictions in order 
to block an auction of firm shares against debts.68 
Hostile takeovers via bankruptcy continued until a law designed to 
remove bankruptcy law as a weapon against owners passed in Fall 2002.69  
The law focused on recalibration of authorizations, for instance making it 
much harder for creditors to refuse to accept payments of debt in order to 
take advantage of bankruptcy proceedings, and giving equity owners 
increased participation.  Bankruptcy-based takeovers quickly faded.70 
B.  Public-Private Manipulation of Authorizations: “Raiding” 
The authorizations so far described have been those of owners and 
creditors.  But the legally allowed discretion of the representatives of the 
state also came to play an important role in Russia’s battles over corporate 
control.  Post-Soviet laws gave Russian judges powers to impose 
“provisional remedies” (obespechitel’nye mery, which can also be translated 
as “interim remedies”)71 forbidding or mandating certain acts at the request 
of plaintiffs.72  The purpose of these powers, analogues of which exist in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 67 GOLDMAN, supra note 64, at 144–46; Firestone, supra note 59, at 1210; Volkov & 
Privalov, supra note 63. 
 68 Oleg Chernitskii, ‘Sidanko’ zanialas’ pereosmysleniem [Sidanko Has Started Rethinking 
its Strategy], VEDOMOSTI, Nov. 30, 1999, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/ 
9638754 (last visited June 20, 2011).  
 69 Tat’iana Mikhailovna Medvedeva, Aleksei Viktorovich Timofeev & Aleksei 
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Governance, Based on the Example of the Institution of Bankruptcy (A Lawyer’s 
Perspective)], in RAZVITIE SPROSA NA PRAVOVOE REGULIROVANIE KORPORATIVNOGO 
UPRAVLENIIA V CHASTNOM SEKTORE [The Development of Demand for Legal Regulation of 
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 70 Firestone, supra note 59, at 1211.  
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is.pdf.  
 72 ARBITRAZHNO-PROTSESSUALNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [APK RF] (Code of 
Arbitration Procedure) art. 90 (Russ.).  
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many legal systems, is to enable judges to ensure that a plaintiff would not 
find a legal victory hollow due to irreversible actions by the defendant before 
the case concludes.73  For instance, a defendant might be enjoined from 
destroying a building claimed by a creditor as collateral against an unpaid 
loan.  Without such provisional remedies, legal defense of property rights 
would often amount to securing an enclosure from which cows have already 
departed.  To encompass the manifold potential scenarios in which plaintiffs’ 
interests might be at risk, powers for interim measures need to be broad and 
flexible.  However, in Russia these features also made provisional remedies a 
useful tool for hampering the exercise of legal authority of all sorts.74  For 
instance, in one prominent Russian bankruptcy case, allies of equity owners 
wished to prevent the creditors’ council from finalizing its plans to sell the 
corporation at auction.75  To do so, they arranged a suit contesting ownership 
over a tiny fraction of the company’s outstanding debt, and successfully 
asked a judge to enjoin actions by the creditors’ council until the dispute was 
resolved.   The distance between the ostensible and actual purposes of the 
suit in question was vast: rather than bearing on the interests of the parties on 
the courtroom, it was in fact a move in a conflict between entirely different 
parties.  For this same reason, tactical use of provisional remedies meant 
sharp uncertainty for owners: they might not be parties to suits that affected 
them profoundly, and therefore learned about the injunctions only when they 
were served.76   
Use of precisely crafted provisional remedies became a common 
phenomenon in the Russian legal system.77  They undermined the security of 
property rights by striking at the reliable exercise of the legal authority 
property grants owners.  Particularly prevalent were efforts to win 
injunctions prohibiting the conducting of shareholder meetings.  In 2003, 
Russia’s highest commercial court (the Supreme Arbitration Court) issued a 
                                                                                                                                                       
 73 See, e.g., H.-U. Freimuller, Attachments and Other Interim Remedies in Support of 
Arbitration: Switzerland, 12 INT’L BUS. L. 119 (1984); Maître Jacques Buhart, Attachments 
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guidance to commercial judges intended to sharply curtail injunctions of this 
sort, suggesting they “contradict the intent of provisional remedies, which 
have as their goal the defense of interests of the plaintiff, and not denying 
another entity the opportunity and right to carry out its own legal activity.”78  
Nevertheless, participants in battles over corporate control continued to 
convince, or suborn, judges to invoke provisional remedies.79  In 2006, the 
Supreme Arbitration Court revisited the matter with a second resolution, this 
one providing judges with lists of reasons to reject applications for 
provisional remedies.80   
Also in 2006, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
(MERT) proposed legislation meant to block abuse of provisional 
remedies.81  The measure was part of a broader set of proposed legal changes 
that became known as the “anti-raider package.”82  While the term ‘raider’ 
(reider, as in ‘corporate raider’) had earlier been applied in the context of 
battles over industrial giants, by the middle of the 2000s the problem was 
generally with smaller businesses, whose premises were often tempting 
targets in a booming real estate market.83  Raider acquired the meaning of an 
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individual or a group that makes use of “fraud, blackmail, obstruction of 
justice, and actual and threatened physical violence” to acquire legal 
ownership of a business.84  Estimates of the number of such ‘raids’ on the 
property rights of small businesses varied widely, but that there were 
certainly hundreds, and quite possibly thousands, of such incidents each year 
from the middle of the decade.85   
Raids involve painstaking legal maneuvers.86  Ideally, from the raiders’ 
point of view, ownership is acquired without the original owners becoming 
aware of their dispossession.87  Then the raiders, often backed by armed men, 
confront the original owners with evidence of the new set of legal 
circumstances and evict them from their premises.88  The most effective 
raider takeovers involve initiating multiple chains of legal events that are 
difficult to reverse.89  For instance, a firm might discover that raiders had (1) 
used forged documents to register a new general director at the state’s 
Unified Registry of Legal Entities; (2) sold the firm to a shell company on 
the new general director’s authority; (3) resold the firm to another shell 
company; (4) officially liquidated the first shell company; (5) resold the firm 
to yet another shell company; etc.90  By mixing fraud (committed through 
exploiting the authorizations of the Unified Registry) with the entirely 
legitimate authority of an owner, raiders created good faith purchasers, 
whose acquisitions were legally difficult to challenge (especially without 
being able to bring suit against the now liquidated intermediaries).91 
Although the details of individual raid schemes can vary, the general 
tactic is to use legal authorizations to multiply and obscure chains of legal 
events that can create significant barriers to restitution.  A MERT consultant 
only somewhat hyperbolically summarized the situation as follows: 
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if someone took your business, in order to regain it you’ll need 
to file 150 suits in 35 courts against various elements of the 
takeover, contesting a stock issue in one court, a decision to 
issue bonds in another, then a decision of the board of 
directors, and 25 stock sale transactions.92 
What is taken in a raid, then, is not physical assets but the authorizations 
accompanying ownership of assets.  When these schemes are deployed with 
the aim of creating irreversible consequences, the resulting legal tangle can 
rapidly achieve Gordian complexity. 
The MERT “anti-raider” proposals offer an excellent illustration of the 
ways in which recognition of law’s authorizing functions illuminates the 
practical challenges of building the rule of law.  While MERT did call for 
specific criminal sanctions against raiderism (reiderstvo), the core of their 
proposal lay in recalibrating or eliminating authorizations that raiders 
regularly exploited.93  In addition to calling for a ban on any interim 
remedies that would force a business to cease operations, MERT suggested 
that multiple lawsuits launched as part of a conflict over control of a firm 
ought to be unified into a single case to be heard in a commercial court 
(arbitrazh) located in the jurisdiction of the firm’s registration.94  This would 
involve switching the jurisdiction of lawsuits by individuals against 
corporations from the general court system to the commercial court system, 
when such lawsuits were in fact ‘masked’ maneuvers in a control conflict.95  
Note that this suggestion involves solely shifting authorizations: restricting in 
certain circumstances the right of individuals to sue companies in the general 
court system, and restricting the general court system’s ability to claim 
jurisdiction over such cases.  The proposal also involved expanded 
authorizations, by legalizing class action suits.96   
With respect to state agencies, MERT sought to hinder raider schemes, 
but to accomplish this without granting state agents new authorizations that 
might provoke corruption.  Thus, the Ministry proposed requiring the 
Unified Registry to check vigorously the authenticity of documents presented 
to it—although this should be done according to tight deadlines to avoid 
leaving the Unified Registry with too great a discretion.97  In a similar vein, 
the ministry also suggested that investigators of criminal charges in cases of 
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raiderism should be prevented from holding company securities as evidence, 
which could interfere with their sale.98 
It was only in late 2009, nearly three years after MERT’s initial 
proposals, that the bulk of them found their way into what became known as 
the “anti-raider law.”99  The history of the anti-raider law illustrates several 
of the distinctive challenges for building the rule of law that attention to 
authorizations reveals.  First, rather than legal stasis, it was adaptive legal 
change that was required to restore the calculability and reliable 
implementation of law.  Despite high profile denunciations of raiderism from 
both Prime Minister Putin and President Minister Medvedev, and the 
continued efforts of MERT representatives to articulate their case, the 
legislative progress of the proposals was extremely slow.100  Jurisdictional 
rivalries between different arms of the state may be part of the reason.  Legal 
advisers to the relevant Duma committee, along with the Constitutional 
Court, objected to the shifting of some lawsuits out of the general court 
system into the commercial courts.101  The long stalemate highlights the 
importance of loophole closing mechanisms. 
Second, an addition to the MERT proposals that appeared in the final law 
was a requirement that commercial courts adjudicating corporate conflicts 
publish details of significant processual events on their official websites.102  
This provision is especially striking in the context of the argument advanced 
earlier on how ignorance of pertinent legal circumstances, rather than laws, 
can be a key source of uncertainty. 
Finally, calibration of authorizations—regulating judges’ use of interim 
measures, specifying jurisdictions, and rights to bring suit—were central to 
political discussion on raiderism and the eventual legislative outcome.103   
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C.  Binding the State and Limiting Corruption 
On definitions either thin or thick, the rule of law demands the state’s 
consistent observance of the rules it has proclaimed.  How and when the 
leadership of a state comes to accept this principle is a matter of much 
discussion and little clarity in the scholarly literature.104  While the focus on 
the authorizing functions of law presented here cannot resolve this 
controversy, it can offer new insights regarding some aspects of the 
discussion. 
If a state (or its leadership) can change the laws at will, the demand that 
the state itself abide by its rules becomes empty.  Thus, a state cannot be 
meaningfully subject to the rule of law unless changing the law is attended 
with some difficulty.  This implies constitutional procedures for adopting 
laws and changing the constitutional procedures themselves.  In discussions 
of property rights, constitutions are often seen as a solution to the 
“fundamental dilemma of property rights,” namely, that to have the capacity 
to defend property rights is to have the capacity to take them away.105  
Indeed, insofar as creditors are protected by seizing the property of debtors 
or property owners by evicting trespassers, the organizational capacities 
involved in defense and confiscation of property are one and the same.  
Constitutional restraint on state action can serve to reassure property owners 
that the rules securing their ownership will not readily be changed.106 
However, the above case studies suggest limits to the argument that 
constitutional constraints on legal change necessarily promote the rule of law 
and the security of property.  Complicating legal change only serves to 
constrain the state if the status quo rules are effective.  To the extent that law 
offers state agents authorizations—for instance, to grant or decline 
provisional remedies—rather than exhaustive scripts for action, the 
constraining force of abiding by the status-quo rules cannot be assumed.  In a 
given set of circumstances, legally authorized discretion that seems facially 
neutral may create vast scope for arbitrary or corrupt action.  In this case, the 
“constitutional” problem of binding the state becomes the problem of 
calibrating the authorizations of state bureaucrats.  Barriers to change of the 
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relevant rules may only preserve a situation in which state representatives 
formally abide by the rules, yet their doing so offers little predictability or 
security. 
Russian businesspeople, fearful of arbitrary bureaucratic action, regularly 
call for legal changes to more precisely specify the scope of bureaucratic 
authority in particular circumstances.107  In discussions over tax reform, for 
instance, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the country’s 
most influential business lobby, argued for strictly limiting the amount of 
time tax inspectors were allowed to spend in an on-site inspection at an 
enterprise.108  In a similar vein, businesspeople have backed proposals to 
specify the amount of time sanitary and fire inspectors are allowed to spend 
visiting a particular establishment.109  Such advocacy of more precisely 
calibrated authorizations makes the assumption that constitutional 
prescriptions alone could enable a credible commitment to secure property or 
predictable exercise of law appear highly implausible.  These discussions 
also illustrate the limitations of a focus on the prohibitions-and-mandates 
aspect of law, which implies solving the problem of excess discretion by 
better detection and punishment of corruption.  The prominence of minutely 
detailed discussions of the design bureaucratic discretion in Russian policy 
debates—including those in the anti-corruption campaign promoted by 
former President Medvedev—suggests that the actors most intimately 
familiar with abuse of office see recalibration of authorizations as an 
important means of avoiding such abuse.110  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The core rule of law ideals are clear enough: that the legitimate legal 
consequences of various acts be predictable, that they correspond to their 
practical legal consequences, and that these descriptions should apply to 
agents of the state no less than other actors.  What remains far less clear is 
how to pursue these ideals.  This Article argued that it is crucial to recognize 
that laws that governing a capitalist order not only forbid some acts and 
require others, but also authorize a multitude of individuals and 
organizations, both inside and outside the state, to create legally significant 
facts at their own discretion.  The rule-of-law ideals are attainable only 
insofar as authorizations are calibrated in ways that prevent their use to 
undermine the calculability and reliable implementation of law.   
Fuller argues that seeking to build the rule of law should not be 
considered a moral duty but rather, in light of the practical and intellectual 
difficulties involved, a moral aspiration.111  A focus on law’s authorizations 
suggests that this aspiration needs to be permanent.  Insofar as the use actors 
make of their authorizations will change based on changing circumstances 
and lawyers’ ingenuity, the rule of law becomes a moving target, dependent 
on the mechanisms that adjust law to practice.112  Indeed, given the 
possibility that some sets of authorizations will be stably calibrated while 
others will not, the attributes of the rule of law may be present with respect 
to one set of rules and empirical situations in a legal situation, even as they 
are absent elsewhere in the same legal system.  Measuring the rule of law on 
a linear scale, or as a to-do list of moral duties, will obscure this complexity 
and with it the crucial processes of the stabilization of expectations.  The rule 
of law is not a lamp, burning brightly or dimly, but illuminating all equally.  
It is, rather, much more like a patchwork quilt, where one may find fraying 
patches side-by-side with sturdy ones.113 
Although the examples provided here are drawn from Russia, nothing 
about the general argument on how miscalibrated authorizations undermine 
the rule of law depends on specific features of the Russian legal system.  
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Indeed, the Russian experience sheds some light on a broader impasse in the 
discussion of whether building the rule of law is an effective route to 
development.  This idea has received powerful backing and led to 
unprecedented levels of international funding for measures supporting the 
rule of law.114  Legal drafting efforts have aimed to create a legislative basis 
for market economies.115  Money has also flowed to efforts to strengthen the 
machinery of justice, improving its human capital through training and its 
physical capital via investments in infrastructure and computerization.116  
The scale of this aid was such that it has given birth to an entire industry—
spanning both academia and a variety of international organizations—that 
analyzes its effectiveness, as well as the character and impact of the rule of 
law more generally.117  Broadly speaking, studies have tended to support the 
importance of the rule of law as the route, or at least one route, to economic 
development.  However, whether the measures of the rule of law employed 
in such studies are meaningful is open to serious doubt.118 
Even more skepticism attends the effectiveness of assistance meant to 
promote the rule of law.  Dezalay and Garth, for instance, argue that rather 
than displacing networks of personal influence and arbitrary decision-making 
with impersonal and impartial rules, the rule of law movement has simply 
elevated the importance of judges and lawyers in those networks.119  Thomas 
Carothers, in a highly influential essay, contended that foreign rule of law 
assistance is of little consequence absent rare whole hearted domestic 
commitment to building the rule of law.120  Other critics have convincingly 
argued that the image of the rule of law embraced by development 
practitioners bears only a caricatured relationship to actual practices in 
developed countries, where variations in the character, role, and economic 
importance of legal systems are rife.121  Rachel Kleinfeld Belton charges that 
rule of law assistance has become an end in itself, delivering funds to legal 
system institutions without adequate reflection on the goals they are 
supposed to attain.122    
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Not all scholars agree with this depressing characterization.  Trebilcock 
and Daniels, in a major recent publication, argue that the rule of law should 
remain at the center of efforts to promote development.123  But their defense 
of rule of law building efforts does not rest so much on refutation of the 
critics as it does on sidestepping their key arguments.  In response to 
Kleinfeld, Trebilcock and Daniels argue that general discontent with law-
administering institutions is a more practical basis for corrective measures 
than a renewed focus on the overall purposes of the rule of law, which will 
lead to “largely sterile debates over normative abstractions, detached from 
their institutional instantiations.”124  Yet one of the reasons they advocate 
continued emphasis on the rule of law is its potential role in cementing a 
political coalition that unites constituencies to whom very different 
institutions may be important.  As they put it: 
to focus most rule of law reform efforts on property rights and 
contract enforcement . . . is to engage a very narrow political 
constituency as proponents of reform and to forego the support 
of the much larger potential political constituencies to whom 
formal property rights and formal contract enforcement are of 
little immediate salience (and in some cases a source of 
potential antipathy), but to whom protection against abuses of 
basic civil and political rights is of general concern.  In these 
respects, private and public law should be seen as necessary 
functional and political complements.125  
In other words, it is precisely the rule of law’s status as a “normative 
abstraction” relevant in diverse institutional realms that makes Trebilcock 
and Daniels declare it a politically expedient slogan. 
This contradiction illustrates the broader impasse at which the debate over 
rule of law promotion has arrived.  On the one hand, rule of law ideals seem 
too demanding, abstract, or impractical.  Here, the critical literature is 
extremely valuable in pointing out the ways in which the effects of laws and 
legal institutions depend on the context in which they operate, and how rare 
empirical approximations to scholarly ideals of the rule of law are.  At the 
same time, sidelining these ideals in favor of a focus on aiding law-providing 
institutions has given unsatisfactory results.  In order to bridge the gulf 
between normatively attractive ideals and their “institutional instantiations,” 
it will be necessary to analyze directly the practicality of rule of law ideals.  
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Put differently, the critical issue is identifying the preconditions for a legal 
system to play the roles of stabilizing expectations and constraining arbitrary 
state action that are celebrated by advocates of the rule of law.  
An appreciation of the consequences of legally authorized discretion has 
much to offer to an analysis of the practicality of the rule of law ideals.  
Among the key lessons is that these ideals are not just effects of general 
procedures, such as public promulgation, as Hayekian and thin views of the 
rule of law might encourage us to believe.126  The content of laws matters.  
As Fuller noted, “a recognition that the internal morality of law may support 
and give efficacy to a wide variety of substantive aims should not mislead us 
into believing that any substantive aim may be adopted without compromise 
of legality.”127  In particular, a law that cannot be enforced will necessarily 
undermine the rule of law.128  The case of a law allocating authorizations that 
sow uncertainty is entirely parallel: it is a direct challenge to the calculability 
and reliable implementation of law. 
This argument suggests promoting the rule of law in developing and 
transition states will not be effective insofar as it focuses solely on pushing 
adoption of “best practice” legislation and aiding the state organizations that 
enforce and interpret it.  It is also important to investigate whether, and how, 
legislation has corrosive effects on the state’s law providers or on the 
reliability of legally guaranteed dealings between private parties.  
Legislation-induced problems, when uncovered, need to be addressed via 
legal change.  And policy must seek to promote such change. 
There are at least two important objections to emphasizing mechanisms 
for legal change that should be addressed.  Some might fear that this 
emphasis would risk such rapid and sweeping changes in law that the ability 
of actors to rely on it will be impaired.  However, this concern is misplaced.  
One cannot link the reliability of law to static statutes when statutes are not 
being translated into consistent and coherent practice.  If law as written is 
breeding uncertainty, failing to change it will do nothing to improve the 
predictability of the legal consequences of various acts. 
Even those who accept that legal change will often be required to stabilize 
expectations might voice a practical concern.  The workings of legal 
evolution—whether via legislation or the court system—are politically 
sensitive and thoroughly domestic in character.  Foreign efforts to promote 
legal evolution might therefore be taken as meddling with matters that ought 
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to be under sovereign control.  Furthermore, it is most unlikely that the 
detailed contextual knowledge required to calibrate authorizations is more 
accessible to foreign experts than to domestic ones.  In the Russian case, 
however, the histories related above demonstrate that there are many 
domestic actors who have pursued legislative or interpretive change.  What 
foreigners can usefully do is to be a resource in these efforts.  For instance, 
“best practice” laws would be much more helpful if accompanied by their 
legislative and interpretive histories, so that they may be offered as models of 
fitting laws to circumstances rather than universal recipes.  Accepting that 
the rule of law is always and everywhere a work in progress might also help 
to dispel tutelary attitudes and facilitate cooperation.  
Attaining rule of law ideals requires changes in particular sets of legal 
provisions that have proved to foster uncertainty or institutional decay.  By 
the same token, an overall “rule of law” is assembled piecemeal.  In this 
light, Trebilcock and Daniels’ call to construct a broad political coalition for 
the rule of law, pursuing both commercial and human rights aims,129 is 
unrealistic.  While both sets of aims will require calibration of authorizations, 
the specific authorizations involved will be very different, and will involve 
distinct sets of contending interests that may not overlap.  Peerenboom has 
argued that a “thin” conception of the rule of law, by highlighting areas of 
consensus rather than the more contentious moral aims built into ‘thick” 
conceptions, opens the way for more productive cooperation between legal 
specialists from different systems.130  The present analysis reinforces this 
point.  If the rule-of-law ideals are normatively attractive, they ought to 
remain so even if they only characterize part of a legal system rather than the 
whole.  And there is always the chance that the craftsmanly skills required to 
achieve predictability and practicability in one sphere of law might in time 
be extended to others. 
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